Consider recent problems with the U.K. railway system. Following a long sequence of rather serious train accidents during the past decades (Paddington3etc), it has been widely accepted that public action is required to turn the tide. A call for more rather than less regulation, therefore, may meet with greater public acceptance. In this situation, it seems, external intervention is an entirely appropriate means to ensure a lower level of risk.
We should not forget that regulation is not the only external constraint on engineers. There are external pressures of many kinds that might influence engineering design. In the first place, of course, there are the wishes of the client. It seems likely that designers often do what clients tell them to do. There are different kinds of regulation. I here consider prescription and goal setting and show that within regulation, there is a definite stratification; both prescription and goal setting have advantages and disadvantages. Moreover, any thinking about regulation in the United Kingdom has to acknowledge changes in the nature of regulation, in particular, the change from prescrip? tion to goal setting.
Prescription Arguments for prescription. A prescriptive form of regulation requires
engineers to show that they have followed relevant codes and standards. For the regulator, the advantage of such codes and standards is that ( 1 ) they embody accumulated historical knowledge and (2) they guarantee some uniformity. The general advantages are consistency and high levels of predictability of technical decisions and solutions. Engineering." 13. For example, the legal system tends to understand responsibility (and therefore blame and punishment) generally as exclusive rather than shared. There may be good reasons why this is so, but it can hardly be a desirable principle for the regulation of technology as a whole.
McCuen (1979) has proposed the following stratification of professional engineering morality (Vesilind and Gunn 1998). It is based on Kohlberg (1984) and Piaget (1965
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